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RESILIENCE BOUNDS OF NETWORK CLOCK
SYNCHRONIZATION WITH FAULT CORRECTION
LINSHAN JIANG, RUI TAN, ARVIND EASWARAN
Abstract. Naturally occurring disturbances and malicious attacks can lead
to faults in synchronizing the clocks of two network nodes. In this paper, we
investigate the fundamental resilience bounds of network clock synchronization
for a system of N nodes against the peer-to-peer synchronization faults. Our
analysis is based on practical synchronization algorithms with time complexity
down to O(N3) that attempt to correct the faults by checking the consistency
among the following three types of data: 1) the estimated faults, 2) the esti-
mated clock offsets among the nodes, and 3) the measured clock offsets from
the potentially faulty peer-to-peer synchronization sessions. Our analysis gives
the following three major results. First, the maximum number of faults that
can be corrected by the algorithms has a tight bound of ⌊N/2⌋−1 when every
node pair performs a synchronization session. Second, by converting the fault
resilience problem to a graph-theoretic edge connectivity problem and apply-
ing Menger’s theorem, we develop an algorithm to compute the tight bound
when not every node pair performs a synchronization session. Third, the num-
ber of synchronization sessions to achieve the capability of correcting any K
faults has a lower bound of ⌈N(2K + 1)/2⌉; we also develop an algorithm to
schedule the synchronization sessions to approach the lower bound. The above
results provide basic understanding and useful guidelines to the design of re-
silient clock synchronization systems. For instance, our results suggest that,
the 4-node network achieves the highest degree of resilience that is defined
as the ratio of the maximum number of correctable faults to the number of
synchronization sessions. Therefore, by organizing a large-scale clock synchro-
nization system into a hierarchy of multiple tiers with each consisting of 4-node
synchronization groups, we can achieve satisfactory and understood resilience
against faults with reduced synchronization sessions.
1. Introduction
For network systems such as wireless sensor networks (WSNs) and coordinated
robots, accurate clock synchronization among the distributed nodes is important.
Correct timestamps make sense the sensing data; synchronized clocks enable punc-
tual coordinated operations among multiple robotic arms that collaborate on a
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production line in a manufacturing system. In contrast, desynchronized clocks will
undermine system performance and even lead to physical damages (e.g., clashing
of robotic arms) and system disruptions in time-critical systems. However, as the
distributed nodes are often deployed in complex physical environments with various
naturally occurring disturbances and even malicious attacks, maintaining resilient
system-wide clock synchronization can be challenging.
Network Time Protocol (NTP) [19] is the foremost means of clock synchroniza-
tion that is widely known and adopted. The nodes in a system running NTP are
organized into a layered hierarchy, in which a stratum-n node acts as a slave in
synchronizing itself with a stratum-(n − 1) node, and as a master when provid-
ing its clock values to stratum-(n + 1) and other stratum-n nodes. Thus, in an
NTP system, the global time that is directly accessed by the stratum-1 nodes is
disseminated to all the nodes stratum by stratum. The intact dissemination highly
depends on the successful peer-to-peer (p2p) clock synchronization sessions. A p2p
synchronization session can be realized by the direct communication between the
two nodes or by the multi-hop communications via several relay nodes. The p2p
synchronization session estimates the offset between the clocks of two synchronizing
nodes (referred to as clock offset in this paper) using a round-trip timing approach.
Specifically, with the one-way packet delivery time estimated as half of the mea-
sured round-trip time, the clock offset can be computed based on the two nodes’
respective clock values when the packet leaves one node and arrives at the other.
With the estimated clock offset, a slave node can reset its clock value or calibrate
its clock advance speed to achieve synchronization with the master node. This
round-trip timing approach is also the basis of the Precision Time Protocol (PTP)
[11] that is adopted in industrial Ethernets for higher synchronization accuracy.
To reduce communication overhead, the clock synchronization approaches devel-
oped for WSNs (e.g., RBS [6], TPSN [7], and FTSP [18]) often assume near-zero
wireless signal propagation times by accessing radio chips’ hardware interrupts and
therefore can synchronize two nodes with a one-way communication.
However, the integrity of the p2p synchronization sessions can be compromised.
A basis of the round-trip timing approach is that the communication link between
the two synchronizing nodes is symmetric, which may not hold faithfully in practice,
however. For instance, in a packet-switched network, the uplink to and downlink
from the master node may take different routes with distinct end-to-end delays.
Over a wireless link, the media access control (MAC) may introduce uncertain
delays of up to hundreds of milliseconds in transmitting a packet [18]. However,
not all systems can perform the packet timestamping in the MAC layer to exclude
this uncertainty from the clock offset estimation. Moreover, as discussed in RFC
7384 [20], the attackers may introduce controlled delays to the deliveries of the
packets and breach the symmetric link assumption. As shown in [25], this packet
delay attack can be implemented in a wired network via a compromised network
router. Moreover, this threat cannot be solved by conventional security measures
such as crytographic authentication and encryption [20, 21, 29]. The violations
of the symmetric link assumption caused by any of the above reasons will lead to
errors in estimating the clock offset and faulty p2p clock synchronization sessions.
The one-way synchronization approaches adopted for WSNs are also susceptible to
the delay. In [8], the packet delay attack against a low-power wide-area network is
implemented by a combination of malicious packet collision and delayed replay.
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In this paper, we investigate the fundamental resilience bounds of network clock
synchronization (NCS) for a system of N nodes against the p2p synchronization
faults. Specifically, we study the problem of deriving the maximum number of p2p
synchronization faults that the network can correct to maintain the clock synchro-
nization among all the nodes, as well as the dual problem of deriving the minimum
number of p2p synchronization sessions to ensure the network’s ability to correct a
specified number of p2p synchronization faults. Our analysis is based on an NCS
algorithm that attempts to correct the p2p synchronization faults. The algorithm
is as follows. Consider an NCS graph G = (V,E), where V and E respectively
denote the set of the nodes in the network and the set of the p2p synchronization
sessions each performed between two nodes. We use |E| to denote the cardinality of
the set E. The kth step of the algorithm assumes that k out of totally |E| p2p syn-
chronization sessions are faulty, exhaustively tests all possible
(
|E|
k
)
combinations of
the assumed faulty p2p synchronization sessions among the |E| sessions, and yields
a solution once the estimated clock offsets and the estimated p2p synchronization
faults agree with all the p2p clock offset measurements. Starting from k = 0, the
algorithm increases k by one in each step and terminates once a solution is found.
This algorithm is practical in that it does not require any run-time knowledge about
the p2p synchronization faults, including the actual number of the faults and which
synchronization sessions out of totally |E| sessions are actually faulty. The imple-
mentation of NCS needs a central node that can execute the compute-intensive
NCS algorithm and can communicate reliably with all the nodes in the network to
collect the results of p2p synchronization sessions. In a sensor network, the gateway
with sufficient compute resources can serve as the NCS central node.
However, analyzing the resilience bounds of the NCS algorithm is challenging.
First, the approach of analyzing all possible cases of the actual faults and assumed
faults incurs prohibitive overhead. Specifically, in the kth step of the algorithm,
we need to analyze a total of
(
|E|
k
)
possible distributions of the assumed faulty
p2p synchronization sessions among the |E| synchronization sessions. Thus, this
approach becomes infeasible when |E| is large. Second, for larger networks with
more nodes, it becomes difficult to enumerate all possible isomorphic NCS graphs
with a certain number of edges. Thus, enumerating all possible cases to analyze
the resilience bounds is not a promising approach.
In this paper, to analyze the resilience bounds, we introduce fault-free NCS
subgraphs and convert the NCS resilience problem to a graph-theoretic problem.
Assisted with the existing results in graph theory, we obtain the following main
analytic results for the resilient NCS problem:
• For a complete NCS graph in which every node pair performs a p2p syn-
chronization session, the tight bound of the maximum number of p2p syn-
chronization faults that can be corrected by the NCS algorithm is
⌊
N
2
⌋− 1.
In other words, the NCS algorithm can synchronize all nodes when the
number of p2p synchronization faults is no greater than the tight bound;
otherwise, some nodes in the network will be desynchronized due to the
faults.
• For any NCS graph that may be incomplete, we convert the fault resilience
problem to a graph-theoretic edge connectivity problem. From our anal-
ysis based on Menger’s theorem [1], we develop an algorithm to compute
the tight bound of the maximum number of p2p synchronization faults
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that can be corrected by the NCS algorithm. Moreover, we develop a new
NCS algorithm with a time complexity of O(N3) that achieves the same
fault correction capability as the original NCS algorithm that has a time
complexity of O
(√
2
N
)
.
• We study the minimum NCS graph that uses the least edges to provide
resilience against a specified number of p2p synchronization faults (denoted
by K). We develop an algorithm to compute the minimum NCS graphs.
We prove that
⌈
N ·(2K+1)
2
⌉
is a lower bound of the number of edges of any
NCS graph that is resilient against K p2p synchronization faults. Numeric
results suggest that the lower bound is tight. The lower bound can be
used to understand the order of magnitude of the number of edges in any
minimum NCS graph.
The analytic results in this paper provide important understanding and useful
guidelines to the design of clock synchronization systems that are resilient to p2p
clock synchronization faults. They are useful to time-critical systems such as indus-
trial wireline and wireless Ethernets. Particularly, in addition to the analysis, this
paper discusses the design of a clock synchronization architecture that strikes a good
trade-off between the p2p synchronization communication overhead and resilience
to p2p faults. Specifically, we use the degree of resilience (DoR) as the resilience
metric, which is defined as the ratio between the number of faults that can be cor-
rected and the number of edges in an NCS graph. Based on our analytic results, we
show that a 4-node network with complete NCS graph achieves the highest DoR of
1/6. From this observation, we propose a tiered clock synchronization architecture
for large-scale networks, in which the nodes in a network are grouped into 4-node
synchronization groups that are organized into multiple tiers. This architecture
provides reduced but well understood resilience against p2p clock synchronization
faults (i.e., every 4-node synchronization group can have one fault), compared with
the original large-scale network with a minimum NCS graph. The number of p2p
synchronization sessions in the proposed architecture is much reduced, compared
with that of the minimum NCS graph.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related
work. Section 3 states the problem. Section 4 analyzes the resilience of several
small-scale networks to illustrate the key challenges in the resilience analysis. Sec-
tion 5 derives the tight resilience bound of complete NCS graphs. Section 6 develops
the algorithms to compute the resilience bound of any graph. Section 7 develops
a fast NCS algorithm with a cubic time complexity that achieves the same fault
correction capability as the original NCS algorithm. Section 8 studies minimum
NCS graphs. Section 9 discusses the implications of our results and a tiered clock
synchronization architecture for fault resilience. Section 10 concludes the paper.
2. Related Work
In this section, we review the implementations of clock synchronization for dif-
ferent network systems and the existing studies on the fault tolerance of NCS.
2.1. Implementations of Clock Synchronization. Highly stable time sources
are often ill-suited for network systems. Despite an initial study of using chip-scale
atomic clock (CSAC) on WSN platforms [5], CSAC is still too expensive ($1,500
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per unit [5]) for wide adoption. Thus, how to synchronize the nodes in different
kinds of network systems has received extensive research.
On the Internet, NTP [19] has been widely used to synchronize computer hosts.
It is universal because it imposes few requirements, i.e., it only requires the host
to timestamp the transmission and reception of the synchronization packets in the
operating system (OS). Compared with NTP, PTP [11] additionally requires the
network interfaces of the synchronizing hosts and all the switches on the network
paths among the hosts to have hardware-level timestamping capability. As such,
PTP can exclude the uncertain OS and packet switching delays from the packet
delivery time measurements, largely improving the accuracy in estimating the clock
offsets. However, malfunctioned hardware-level timestamping will lead to p2p syn-
chronization faults. The reference implementations of NTP and PTP have various
mechanisms to improve their robustness against p2p synchronization faults. For
instance, in NTP, when the round-trip time exceeds one second, the current p2p
synchronization session is considered faulty and will not be used to calibrate the
host’s clock. Moreover, a slave node will average the clock offset estimation results
obtained with multiple master nodes to guide its clock calibration. Despite these
heuristics in the protocol implementation for fault resilience, an analytic under-
standing regarding the network’s resilience against the p2p synchronization faults
is still lacking.
Over the past decade, WSN clock synchronization has been widely studied.
There are accurate global time broadcasts from the Global Positioning System
(GPS) and timekeeping radio stations (e.g., WWVB in U.S.). However, GPS and
radio receivers have various limitations such as high power consumption, poor sig-
nal reception in indoor environments (e.g., 47% good time for WWVB [2]), and
susceptibility to wireless spoofing attacks [22]. Thus, GPS and radio receivers are
often employed on a limited number of time masters to provide global time to the
slave nodes via some clock synchronization protocol. The resilience of the clock
synchronization between the master and the slaves is the focus of this paper.
Early studies have designed clock synchronization protocols based on message
passing, such as RBS [6], TPSN [7], and FTSP [18]. Recent studies exploit various
external periodic signals for clock synchronization [30, 25, 34], time fingerprinting
[17, 9, 30, 15, 18], and clock calibration [26, 16, 10, 14]. Time fingerprinting ap-
proaches focus on studying the global time information embedded in the sensing
data such as microseisms [17], sunlight [9], powerline voltage [30], and electromag-
netic radiation [15]. They can be a basis for clock synchronization. For instance,
the work [30] achieves microseconds clock synchronization accuracy by using the
time fingerprints found in the electric voltages of a building’s power network. Dif-
ferent from clock synchronization that ensures the clocks to have the same value,
clock calibration ensures different clocks to advance at the same speed. The ap-
proaches presented in [26, 16, 10, 14] exploit powerline electromagnetic radiation,
fluorescent lamp flickering, Wi-Fi beacons, and FM Radio Data System broadcasts
to calibrate the clocks of WSN nodes. Clock calibration may not need any inter-
node communications, whereas clock synchronization must need communicating
one or more timestamps between two synchronizing nodes. However, all the above
studies [6, 7, 18, 30, 25, 34, 17, 9, 15, 26, 16, 10, 14] focus on devising clock syn-
chronization/calibration approaches. They fall short of analyzing the resilience of
the system against potential clock synchronization faults.
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2.2. Fault Tolerance of NCS. The fault tolerance of NCS against Byzantine
clock faults has been studied [4, 13]. A Byzantine faulty clock gives an arbitrary
clock value whenever being read. It has been proved that, to guarantee the syn-
chronization of non-faulty clocks in the presence of m faulty clocks, a total of at
least (3m+ 1) clocks are needed. Different from the Byzantine faulty clock model,
we consider faulty p2p synchronization sessions between the clocks. The conversion
of our problem to the Byzantine clock synchronization problem by considering ei-
ther node involving a faulty p2p synchronization session as a faulty clock is invalid,
because this faulty clock after the conversion is not a Byzantine faulty clock, unless
all p2p synchronization sessions involving this clock are faulty. As our problem
does not have this assumption, the the analysis in [4, 13] and the resulted fault
tolerance bound are not applicable to our problem. Moreover, different from the
fault-tolerant systems in [4, 13] that do not try to correct the faults, our resilient
NCS system tries to correct the p2p synchronization faults.
Our prior work [28] presented the formulation of the resilience of NCS against
p2p synchronization faults. It developed an algorithm to compute a lower bound
and derived a closed-form upper bound of the maximum number of faults that can
be corrected for any complete NCS graph. In this paper, we derive the closed-
form tight bound of resilience for any complete NCS graph, which represents a
substantial improvement to the results in [28]. Moreover, this paper studies three
new problems: (1) the resilience bounds of NCS graphs that can be incomplete
(Section 6) , (2) fast NCS algorithm with polynomial complexity to achieve the
same fault correction capability as the original NCS algorithm (Section 7), and (3)
the minimum NCS graphs providing a specified level of resilience (Section 8).
3. Problem Statement
This section presents the system model (Section 3.1) and states the research
problem (Section 3.2). In Section 3.3, we discuss several abstractions in our system
model and their relations with real NCS systems.
3.1. System Model and NCS. To improve the robustness of clock synchroniza-
tion against p2p synchronization faults, this section proposes an approach to cross-
check the p2p synchronization results among multiple nodes and correct the faults
if present.
Let V denote the set of N nodes in a network, i.e., V = {n0, n1, . . . , nN−1},
where ni represents the ith node. Let δij denote the clock offset between the nodes
ni and nj , which is unknown and to be estimated. Specifically, δij = ci(t) − cj(t),
where ci(t) and cj(t) are the clock values of ni and nj at any given Newtonian time
instant t, respectively. We assume that δij is time-invariant. In Section 3.3, we
will discuss the validity of this assumption in real systems. By designating n0 as
the reference node, we have the relationship δij = δi0 − δj0, which will be used for
analysis in the rest of this paper.
Denote by ni ↔ nj the p2p synchronization session between ni and nj . Denote
by δ˜ij the measured clock offset via ni ↔ nj . If the synchronization session ni ↔ nj
is successful (i.e., non-faulty), δ˜ij = δij ; if the synchronization session is faulty,
δ˜ij = δij + eij , where eij is the p2p synchronization fault which is a non-zero
and finite real number. Let E denote the set of all p2p synchronization sessions
performed in a synchronization round. In our NCS approach, the result of at most
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Algorithm 1 NCS algorithm with fault correction.
Given: {δ˜ij |∀ni ↔ nj ∈ E}
Output: {δˆj0|∀j ∈ [1, N − 1]} and {eˆij|∀ni ↔ nj ∈ E}
1: k ← 0
2: while k ≤ |E| do
3: for each distribution of the k estimated p2p synchronization faults among
the |E| p2p synchronization sessions do
4: if the corresponding variant of Eq. (1) with the k estimated p2p synchro-
nization faults has a solution then
5: return {δˆj0|∀j ∈ [1, N − 1]} and {eˆij |∀ni ↔ nj ∈ E}
6: end if
7: end for
8: k ← k + 1
9: end while
one p2p synchronization session performed between any pair of nodes is used in
one synchronization round. Note that the analysis of this paper is agnostic to the
technique used for each synchronization session. For instance, a round-trip timing
process can be used to obtain δ˜ij between ni and nj . Moreover, since at most one
synchronization session between ni and nj is used in one synchronization round,
the edge ni ↔ nj can be modeled undirected.
For a synchronization round, the undirected graph G = (V,E) is called the NCS
graph. In a complete NCS graph, every node pair performs a p2p synchronization
session, resulting in |E| = (N2 ) = N(N−1)2 . For any NCS graph G = (V,E) that may
be incomplete, the NCS is performed as follows. All the clock offset measurements
are transmitted to a central node, which runs the NCS algorithm that is shown in
Algorithm 1. The central node can undertake compute-intensive NCS algorithm
and can communicate reliably with all the nodes. It can be an external entity (e.g.,
a cloud service) or any connected node in the network. For the latter case, the
central node may not be the reference node; various strategies can be used to select
the central node. For example, in a battery-powered network that concerns about
the nodes’ energy consumption, a node with the most remaining battery energy
can perform the role of central node to receive the clock offset measurements and
run the NCS algorithm. We assume that the p2p clock synchronization sessions
are separate from the transmissions of the clock offset measurements to the central
node. In certain cases, the transmission of the measured clock offset can be avoided.
For instance, if the round-trip timing approach is used and the central node initiates
the round-trip timing, the central node obtains δ˜ij on the completion of the round-
trip timing and requires no separate transmission of δ˜ij . Note that, when every
node performs a p2p synchronization session with the reference node, the NCS
graph G will have a star topology centered at the reference node. Algorithm 1 and
all analytic results in this paper are also applicable to this star NCS graph.
We now explain Algorithm 1. Denote by δˆij and eˆij the estimates for δij and eij .
A general equation system assuming that all synchronization sessions are faulty is{
δˆj0 + eˆj0 = δ˜j0, ∀nj ↔ n0 ∈ E, j 6= 0;
δˆi0 − δˆj0 + eˆij = δ˜ij , ∀ni ↔ nj ∈ E, i 6= 0, j 6= 0.
(1)
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The variables to be solved are the unknowns {δˆj0|∀j ∈ [1, N − 1]} and {eˆij |∀ni ↔
nj ∈ E}, where δˆj0 is the estimated clock offset between nj and the reference
node n0; eˆij is the estimated p2p clock synchronization fault between ni and nj if
they have performed the p2p synchronization session in the current synchronization
round. Note that regardless of E, we aim at solving the clock offset between every
node and the reference node. If there are too few edges in E, Eq. (1) may have
infinite number of solutions. Our resilience definition in Section 3.2 accounts for
this situation.
Let k denote the assumed number of faults, which can be different from the
actual number of faults. The scattering of the k assumed faults on the |E| p2p
synchronization sessions is called distribution of the assumed faults. As shown
in Algorithm 1, the NCS algorithm starts by assuming there are no faults (i.e.,
k ← 0). In each iteration of the algorithm that increases k by one, the algorithm
solves the variants of Eq. (1) that capture all
(
|E|
k
)
possible distributions of the k
assumed faulty p2p synchronization sessions among all the |E| p2p synchronization
sessions. Specifically, a variant of Eq. (1) is generated by keeping k estimated p2p
synchronization faults (i.e., eˆj0 or eˆij) in Eq. (1) and removing other estimated p2p
synchronization faults. Once a solution is found, Algorithm 1 returns the estimates
{δˆj0|∀j ∈ [1, N − 1]} and {eˆij|∀ni ↔ nj ∈ E}. If δˆj0 = δj0, ∀j ∈ [1, N − 1], we say
Algorithm 1 can correct the faults.
Algorithm 1 requires neither the actual number nor the actual distribution of
the p2p synchronization faults. Whether it can correct the faults and how many
faults it can correct will be the focus of this paper. Algorithm 1 is a centralized
algorithm executed on the central node. The time complexity of the kth step of
Algorithm 1 is O
((
|E|
k
))
. Thus, the time complexity upper bound of Algorithm 1 is
O
(∑|E|
k=0
(
|E|
k
))
= O
(
2|E|
)
. In Section 7.2, we further show that the time complex-
ity lower bound of Algorithm 1 is Ω
(√
2
N
)
for complete NCS graphs. Therefore,
Algorithm 1 has an exponential time complexity. In Section 7.2, based on a graph-
theoretic analysis, we will develop a fast NCS algorithm with a time complexity of
O(N3) that provides the same fault correction capability as Algorithm 1. With the
fast algorithm, the centralized NCS is scalable to network size. The resilience of
the centralized NCS provides important baseline understanding on the resilience of
synchronizing a network of nodes.
3.2. Problem Statement. Let Z≥0 denote the set of non-negative integers.
Definition 1 (K-resilience). Let K ∈ Z≥0 denote the number of faulty p2p syn-
chronization sessions among a total of |E| sessions in an NCS graph G = (V,E).
The network with the NCS graph G is K-resilient if Algorithm 1 can correct any
K p2p synchronization faults. 
From Algorithm 1, we define the K-resilience condition that can be used to check
whether a network with G is K-resilient.
Definition 2 (K-resilience condition). A network with G is K-resilient if the fol-
lowing conditions are satisfied:
(1) ∀k ∈ [0,K), the variant of Eq. (1) corresponding to any distribution of the
K actual p2p synchronization faults and any distribution of the k estimated
p2p synchronization faults has no solutions;
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(2) When k = K, for any distribution of the K actual p2p synchronization
faults and any distribution of the k estimated p2p synchronization faults,
(a) if the distribution of the k estimated p2p synchronization faults is
identical to the distribution of the actual faults, Eq. (1) has a unique
solution;
(b) otherwise, Eq. (1) has no solutions. 
Note that under the condition (2)-(a) of Definition 2, if Eq. (1) has a unique
solution, the solution must give the correct estimates of the clock offsets and the
p2p synchronization faults, since these correct estimates form a valid solution. Note
that if the K-resilience condition in Definition 2 is satisfied, Algorithm 1 must be
able to correct any K faults. However, when the condition (2)-(b) of Definition 2 is
not satisfied, Algorithm 1 can still correctK faults with a specific distribution of the
faults. This occurs when the first attempted distribution of the K estimated faults
happens to be identical to the actual distribution of the K faults. However, in this
case, the network is not K-resilient, because Definition 1 requires that Algorithm 1
can correct any K faults to claim K-resilience. Thus, Definition 2 gives a sufficient
condition for Algorithm 1 to correct any K faults; it is a sufficient and necessary
condition for K-resilience.
Let G denote the infinite set of all NCS graphs. We define the following resilience
bounds:
Definition 3 (Lower bound of maximum resilience). A function fl(G) : G 7→ Z≥0
is a lower bound of maximum resilience for a network with an NCS graph G if the
network is K-resilient for K ≤ fl(G). 
Definition 4 (Upper bound of maximum resilience). A function fu(G) : G 7→ Z≥0
is an upper bound of maximum resilience for a network with an NCS graph G if
the network is not K-resilient for K > fu(G). 
Definition 5 (Tight bound of maximum resilience). A function ft(G) : G 7→ Z≥0
is a tight bound of maximum resilience for a network with an NCS graph G if the
network is K-resilient for K ≤ ft(G) and not K-resilient for K > ft(G). 
This paper aims at investigating the above resilience bounds under various NCS
graph (e.g., complete or not) and the dual problem of what NCS graph condition
can ensure a certain resilience bound.
3.3. Relations with Real Clock Synchronization Systems. The systemmodel
described in Section 3.1 includes several abstractions to clearly formulate the K-
resilience concept in Section 3.2 and allow us to focus on the essence of the problem.
In this section, we discuss the potential deviations of the real systems from these
abstractions and the impact of such deviations on our analysis in the reminder of
this paper.
3.3.1. Definition of fault. In this paper, we focus on the faults that are caused by
erroneous clock offset estimates. We do not consider other faults such as missing
clock offset estimates. In Section 3.1, any deviation of the measured clock offset
from its true value is regarded as a fault. Under this rigorous definition of fault, we
can describe the NCS algorithm and define the K-resilience without any vagueness.
In real systems, a p2p clock synchronization session may have some clock offset
estimation error due to inevitable random noises. The system designer often has
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good knowledge of these random noises (e.g., their sources and probabilistic dis-
tributions) and designs the clock synchronization mechanism to limit the resulted
clock offset estimation errors to acceptable ranges. In practice, the clock offset esti-
mation errors that are caused by unforeseen situations (e.g., hardware malfunction
and packet delay attack [25, 20, 21, 29]) and beyond the acceptable ranges can
be regarded as faults. Following this principle, in this section, we discuss how to
extend our formulation to address 1) a class of sensing-based clock synchronization
systems and 2) other systems under more general settings.
In the sensing-based clock synchronization systems [30, 25, 34, 15], the clock
offset estimation errors follow a discrete pattern. Specifically, the error is given
by eij = ǫij +mij · T , where T is the period of the external signal being sensed,
mij is an integer, and ǫij is a random noise with magnitude much smaller than
T . For instance, in the study [30] that exploits powerline voltages to synchronize
nodes in a city, T is 20 milliseconds in a 50Hz power grid and the absolute value
of ǫij is about 0.1 milliseconds (i.e., 0.5% of T ). The discrete pattern is caused by
abnormal noises of the used external signals and some integer nature of the clock
synchronization algorithms to leverage on the periodicity of the external signals.
For these systems, the p2p synchronization sessions with mij 6= 0 can be regarded
as faulty sessions. Due to the random noises ǫij , Eq. (1) generally has no exact
solutions even when there are no faulty p2p synchronization sessions (i.e., K = 0)
and the considered k = 0. Instead, a candidate solution to Eq. (1) can be obtained
by minimizing the following overall residual:∑
∀nj↔n0∈E
∀j 6=0
∣∣∣δˆj0 + eˆj0 − δ˜j0∣∣∣2 + ∑
∀ni↔nj∈E
∀i6=0,∀j 6=0
∣∣∣δˆi0 − δˆj0 + eˆij − δ˜ij ∣∣∣2 . (2)
The candidate solution can be substituted into each equation in Eq. (1) to check
if the absolute residual exceeds some threshold set according to the distribution
of the random noise ǫij . For example, we can set one millisecond for the system
in [30]. If every absolute residual does not exceed the threshold, we view the
candidate solution as a valid solution to Eq. (1) in Line 4 of Algorithm 1. The
integer programming formulation in Eq. (2) exploits the discrete pattern of the
synchronization faults. It reduces the impact of random synchronization errors on
the accuracy of determining whether Eq. (1) has a solution.
For systems with a more general error pattern of eij = ǫij +xij ·Fij where xij is
0 or 1 and Fij is an arbitrary number beyond the range of ǫij , the synchronization
sessions with xij = 1 can be regarded as faulty sessions. The residual minimization
and candidate solution checking approaches described above can be applied as well.
In Section 4.3, we will present a set of simulation results that consider the general
error pattern.
Despite the above variations to address acceptable clock offset estimation errors,
our abstracted formulation in Section 3.1 and Section 3.2 capture the essence of
the problem. The analysis based on the formulation will provide insightful under-
standing regarding the fault resilience of the NCS mechanism in Algorithm 1.
3.3.2. Time-invariant clock offset. In Section 3.1, we assume that the clock offset
δij is time-invariant. In practice, the clock offset δij can be time-varying because
the clocks of ni and nj may advance at different speeds. However, the change
of δij during a p2p synchronization session is often negligible compared with the
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clock offset estimation errors of successful p2p synchronization sessions. In most
clock synchronization systems, a p2p synchronization session takes a short time
(e.g., tens of milliseconds in NTP, PTP, and sensing-based clock synchronization
such as [25]). Typical crystal oscillators found in microcontrollers and personal
computers have drift rates of 30 to 50 parts-per-million (ppm) [10]. Thus, the
change of the clock offset during a synchronization session of 100 milliseconds is at
most 5 microseconds only, whereas the clock offset estimation errors of successful
synchronization sessions are at sub-millisecond [30, 25] or milliseconds levels [34].
Thus, the small variation of the clock offset during a synchronization session can
be viewed as a nearly negligible part of the clock offset estimation error, where
the latter is further much smaller than the synchronization faults as discussed in
Section 3.3.1. Therefore, we can safely ignore the variation of clock offset in studying
the resilience of NCS against synchronization faults.
4. K-Resilience Analysis for Example Networks
In this section, we present the vectorization of Eq. (1) to facilitate our analysis
(Section 4.1) and then analyze the K-resilience for several small-scale networks
with complete NCS graphs (Section 4.2). The analysis illustrates the challenges in
the general analysis of the K-resilience for any network, but also provides guiding
insights. Lastly, we provide a set of simulation results to show the impact of non-
faulty synchronization errors on the NCS algorithm (Section 4.3).
4.1. Vectorization. We vectorize the representation of Eq. (1) that is solved by
Line 4 of Algorithm 1. Define δˆ ∈ RN−1 composed of all clock offset estimates, i.e.,
δˆ =
(
δˆ10, δˆ20, . . . , δˆ(N−1)0
)⊺
. Define eˆ ∈ Rk composed of the k p2p synchronization
fault estimates. Eq. (1) can be rewritten as (A1A2)
(
δˆ
eˆ
)
= b, where A1 ∈
R|E|×(N−1) and A2 ∈ R|E|×k are two matrices composed of −1, 0, and 1 containing
coefficients corresponding to δˆ·0 and eˆ··, respectively; the vector b ∈ R|E| consists
of all the measured clock offsets. To simplify notation, we define A = (A1A2) and
x =
(
δˆ
eˆ
)
. The Ax = b is called NCS equation system. From the Rouche´-Capelli
theorem [27], the necessary and sufficient condition that Ax = b has no solutions
is rank(A|b) 6= rank(A), where A|b is the augmented matrix.
4.2. K-Resilience of Small-Scale Networks. This section presents the analysis
on the K-resilience of several small-scale networks with complete NCS graphs.
Proposition 1. A 3-node network with a complete NCS graph is not 1-resilient.
Proof. Consider a case where the p2p synchronization session n1 ↔ n2 is faulty.
When k = 0 in Algorithm 1, the vectorized equation system in Eq. (1) is 1 00 1
−1 1
 ( δˆ10
δˆ20
)
=
 δ10δ20
δ20 − δ10 + e21
 .
⇑ ⇑ ⇑
A x b
Note that A2 and eˆ are empty. With e21 6= 0, Gaussian elimination shows that
rank(A|b) 6= rank(A). Thus, the equation system has no solutions and Algorithm 1
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will move on to the case of k = 1. The algorithm will attempt to test all the(
|E|
k
)
=
(
3
1
)
= 3 possible cases of a single faulty p2p synchronization session. For
instance, when the algorithm assumes that n0 ↔ n1 is faulty, the NCS equation
system is  1 0 10 1 0
−1 1 0
 δˆ10δˆ20
eˆ10
 =
 δ10δ20
δ20 − δ10 + e21
 .
With e21 6= 0, we have rank(A|b) = rank(A) and A has full column rank. Thus,
the NCS equation system has a unique solution. Therefore, the condition (2)-(b) of
Definition 2 is not satisfied and the network is not 1-resilient. The unique solution is
{δˆ10 = δ10−e21, δˆ20 = δ20, eˆ10 = e21}, which gives wrong clock offset estimates. 
Proposition 2. A 4-node network with a complete NCS graph is 1-resilient.
We provide a sketch of the proof as follows instead of a complete proof for
presentation conciseness. In fact, this proposition is a corollary of Theorem 1 with
a complete proof in Section 5.3. Thus, the omission of the complete proof here
does not cause loss of rigor. Consider a case where the p2p synchronization session
n0 ↔ n2 is faulty. When k = 0 in Algorithm 1, similar to Proposition 1, the NCS
equation system has no solutions and Algorithm 1 will move on to the case of k = 1.
The algorithm will test all the
(
|E|
k
)
=
(
6
1
)
= 6 possible cases of a single faulty p2p
synchronization session. For instance, when the algorithm assumes n0 ↔ n1 is
faulty, the NCS equation system is
1 0 0 1
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
−1 1 0 0
0 −1 1 0
−1 0 1 0


δˆ10
δˆ20
δˆ30
eˆ10
 =

δ10
δ20 + e20
δ30
δ20 − δ10
δ30 − δ20
δ30 − δ10
 . (3)
As rank(A|b) 6= rank(A), the NCS equation system has no solutions. An exhaus-
tive check shows that, only when the algorithm assumes the synchronization session
between n0 and n2 is faulty, the NCS equation system has a unique solution (i.e.,
rank(A|b) = rank(A) and A has full column rank). Thus, the algorithm can cor-
rect the fault. In fact, it can be verified that, for the complete 4-node NCS graph,
no matter which p2p synchronization session is faulty, the algorithm can correct
the fault. Therefore, the 4-node system is 1-resilient.
Proposition 3. A 4-node network with a complete NCS graph is not 2-resilient.
Proof. Consider the 4-node network with two faulty p2p synchronization sessions:
n0 ↔ n1 and n0 ↔ n2. When k = 0, the equation system has no solutions. When
k = 1, consider a case where n0 ↔ n3 is assumed to be faulty by the algorithm.
The NCS equation system is
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 1
−1 1 0 0
−1 0 1 0
0 −1 1 0


δˆ10
δˆ20
δˆ30
eˆ30
 =

δ10 + e10
δ20 + e20
δ30
δ20 − δ10
δ30 − δ10
δ30 − δ20
 . (4)
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If e10 6= e20, rank(A|b) 6= rank(A) and the equation system has no solutions.
However, if e10 = e20, rank(A|b) = rank(A) and A has full column rank; the
equation system has a unique solution of {δˆ10 = δ10 + e10, δˆ20 = δ20 + e10, δˆ30 =
δ30 + e10, eˆ30 = −e10}, which gives wrong clock offset estimates. Although this
counterexample against the 4-node network’s 2-resilience is obtained under a certain
condition of e10 = e20, we can conclude that the 4-node network is not 2-resilient.

To gain more insights, we also analyze a case of k = 2 with n0 ↔ n1 and n0 ↔ n3
assumed to be faulty by the algorithm. The NCS equation system is
1 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 1
−1 1 0 0 0
−1 0 1 0 0
0 −1 1 0 0


δˆ10
δˆ20
δˆ30
eˆ10
eˆ30
 =

δ10 + e10
δ20 + e20
δ30
δ20 − δ10
δ30 − δ10
δ30 − δ20
 . (5)
As rank(A|b) = rank(A) and A has full column rank, the equation system has
a unique solution, which violates the 2-resilience condition. In fact, the equation
system has a unique solution that gives wrong clock offset estimates and does not
require any relationship between e10 and e20. This solution is {δˆ10 = δ10+e20, δˆ20 =
δ20 + e20, δˆ30 = δ30 + e20, eˆ10 = e10 − e20, eˆ30 = −e20}.
Proposition 4. A 5-node network with a complete NCS graph is 1-resilient.
We provide a sketch of the proof as follows instead of a complete proof due to
space limit. This proposition is in fact a corollary of Theorem 1 with a complete
proof. Thus, the omission here does not cause loss of rigor. Consider a 5-node
network with one p2p synchronization fault. The resilience is independent from how
we name the nodes. We name the two nodes involved in the faulty synchronization
session as n0 and n1. An exhaustive check over all the
(
|E|
k
)
=
(
10
1
)
= 10 possible
cases for a single assumed faulty synchronization session shows that the 1-resilience
condition is satisfied. Thus, the 5-node network is 1-resilient.
Proposition 5. A 5-node network with a complete NCS graph is not 2-resilient.
Proof. We consider a 5-node network, in which (i) the p2p synchronization sessions
n0 ↔ n1 and n1 ↔ n4 are faulty and (ii) the p2p synchronization sessions n1 ↔ n2
and n1 ↔ n3 are assumed by the algorithm to be faulty. The NCS equation system
is 
1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
−1 1 0 0 1 0
−1 0 1 0 0 1
−1 0 0 1 0 0
0 −1 1 0 0 0
0 −1 0 1 0 0
0 0 −1 1 0 0


δˆ10
δˆ20
δˆ30
δˆ40
eˆ21
eˆ31
 =

δ10 + e10
δ20
δ30
δ40
δ20 − δ10
δ30 − δ10
δ40 − δ10 + e41
δ30 − δ20
δ40 − δ20
δ40 − δ30

. (6)
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If e10 = −e41, the equation system has a unique solution of {δˆ10 = δ10 + e10, δˆ20 =
δ20, δˆ30 = δ30, δˆ40 = δ40, eˆ21 = e10, eˆ31 = e10}, which violates the resilience condi-
tion. Thus, a 5-node network is not 2-resilient. 
In the proofs of Propositions 1, 3, and 5, we adopt an approach of enumerat-
ing counterexamples to prove that a network is not K-resilient. In the proofs of
Propositions 3 and 5, if the actual faults satisfy certain conditions, the rank of A|b
may change, presenting a pitfall to the approach of enumerating counterexamples.
This is a challenge in pursuing the general analysis for K-resilience. To address
this challenge, in Section 5, we will introduce a fault-free NCS subgraph method to
analyze the tight bound of complete NCS graphs.
4.3. Simulations with Non-Faculty Synchronization Errors. We conduct
simulations to evaluate the impact of the non-faculty synchronization errors dis-
cussed in Section 3.3.1 on the performance of Algorithm 1. The simulations are
for the small-scale example network topologies analyzed in Section 4.2. The p2p
synchronization session follows a general error pattern of e = ǫ + x · F , where ǫ
is a Gaussian noise following the standard normal distribution, the absolute value
of the fault F is uniformly distributed within the range of [2, 8], the binary cof-
ficient x is randomly sampled from {0, 1}. The synchronization error with x = 1
is viewed as a fault. The clock offset of each node with respect to the reference
node is randomly and uniformly sampled from [−10, 10]. We use the least squares
approach in Eq. (2) to generate the candidate solution of the NCS equation system.
As discussed in Section 3.3.1, we apply a threshold of η = 2 to check the residual of
each equation of the NCS equation system to decide whether a candidate solution
is a valid solution. With the setting of η = 2, the probability of misclassifying a
non-faulty synchronization error as a fault is Pr(|ǫ| ≥ 2) = 0.046. For each net-
work, we simulate a number of cases with different numbers of faults. For each
case, we report the mean-square error (MSE) of the estimated clock offsets of all
the nodes and whether the distribution of the estimated p2p synchronization faults
is identical to the distribution of the actual faults.
Tables 1, 2, and 3 show the simulation results for the 3-node, 4-node, and 5-node
networks, respectively. From Table 1, we can see that Algorithm 1 can opportunisti-
cally correct one fault, in which the distributions of the estimated faults and actual
faults are identical and the MSE is small. When the distributions of the estimated
p2p synchronization faults and the actual faults are not identical, the MSE of the
estimated clock offsets is large. This means that Algorithm 1 cannot correct the
faults. From Table 1, Algorithm 1 cannot correct more than one fault. This result
is consistent with Proposition 1. Note that we have explained in Section 3.2 that,
for a network that is not K-resilient, Algorithm 1 may be able to correct K faults
with a specific distribution that happens to be identical to the first attempted fault
distribution in Algorithm 1. From Tables 2 and 3, we can see that Algorithm 1
can always correct one fault and opportunistically correct two faults. This result is
consistent with Propositions 2, 3, 4, and 5. From this set of simulation results, we
can see that our analytic results provide good understanding for the scenarios with
non-faulty synchronization errors.
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Table 1. NCS results of a 3-node network with non-faulty syn-
chronization errors.
Case Number of faults Identical?* MSE of estimated clock offsets
1 1 yes 2.8721
2 1 no 14.5525
3 1 no 23.4256
4 1 no 37.2651
5 2 no 34.5164
6 2 no 53.2659
7 2 no 67.5983
8 3 no 79.3514
*This column indicates whether the distributions of estimated faults and actual faults are
identical.
Table 2. NCS results of a 4-node network with non-faulty syn-
chronization errors.
Case Number of faults Identical?* MSE of estimated clock offsets
1 1 yes 1.1329
2 1 yes 1.9569
3 1 yes 0.5390
4 1 yes 2.1312
5 2 yes 2.0863
6 2 no 13.3885
7 2 no 40.8532
8 3 no 58.8646
*This column indicates whether the distributions of estimated faults and actual faults are
identical.
Table 3. NCS results of a 4-node network with non-faulty syn-
chronization errors.
Case Number of faults Identical?* MSE of estimated clock offsets
1 1 yes 2.1296
2 1 yes 1.0586
3 1 yes 2.2766
4 2 yes 2.5198
5 2 no 13.5984
6 2 no 10.5354
7 3 no 19.8177
8 3 no 22.5147
*This column indicates whether the distributions of estimated faults and actual faults are
identical.
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5. Tight Bound of Maximum Resilience of Any Network with
Complete NCS Graph
In this section, our analysis shows that the tight bound of maximum resilience of
any N -node network with a complete NCS graph is ft(N) =
⌊
N
2
⌋− 1. Note that in
this section we change the notation ft(G) defined in Definition 5 to ft(N), because
the complete NCS graph G solely depends on N . In what follows, we introduce
the fault-free NCS subgraph (Section 5.1) and prove two lemmas (Section 5.2). The
lemmas will be used to prove the tight bound of maximum resilience (Section 5.3).
5.1. Fault-Free NCS Subgraph. For a certain distribution of the estimated p2p
synchronization faults among the |E| sessions, we retain all the equations in Eq. (1)
that contain neither estimated fault eˆij nor actual fault eij to generate an equation
subsystem Asδˆ = bs. This equation subsystem corresponds to a fault-free NCS
subgraph Gs = (V,Es), where each edge in Es represents a p2p synchronization
session associated with neither estimated nor actual synchronization fault. The Gs
is a subgraph of the original complete NCS graph G.
For instance, to generate the Asδˆ = bs of Eq. (6), we can remove the rows and
columns of Eq. (6) as follows:
1 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 1
−1 1 0 0 0
−1 0 1 0 0
0 −1 1 0 0


δˆ10
δˆ20
δˆ30
eˆ10
eˆ30
 =

δ10 + e10
δ20 + e20
δ30
δ20 − δ10
δ30 − δ10
δ30 − δ20
 .
The first and the third rows of A and b are removed because they involve estimated
faults eˆ10 and eˆ30. Specifically, the fourth element of A’s first row that corresponds
to eˆ10 is 1; the last element of A’s third row that corresponds to eˆ30 is 1. The
second row of A is removed because it involves the actual fault e20 from the second
row of b. The last two columns of A are removed because we no longer have eˆ10
and eˆ30. The remainders form Asδˆ = bs, i.e., −1 1 0−1 0 1
0 −1 1
 δˆ10δˆ20
δˆ30
 =
 δ20 − δ10δ30 − δ10
δ30 − δ20
 .
5.2. The Lemmas. Following the convention of graph theory, we say an undirected
graph is connected when there is a path between every pair of vertices. We have
the following lemmas.
Lemma 1. For a complete NCS graph G = (V,E) and a certain distribution of the
estimated p2p synchronization faults, if the fault-free NCS subgraph Gs is connected,
the NCS equation system Ax = b has at most one solution.
Proof. Since Gs is connected, we can find a traversal of Gs starting from n0 and
ending at any node ni, which is represented by a list 〈n0, nw1 , nw2 , . . . , nwp , ni〉.
Note that, in the above list, two different symbols nwx and nwy may refer to the
same node in the network. We can formulate a system of equations along the above
traversal, where each equation corresponds to an edge connecting two consecutive
nodes in the traversal. The equation system consists of δˆw10 = δw10, δˆw10 − δˆw20 =
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δw10−δw20, δˆw20−δˆw30 = δw20−δw30, . . ., δˆwp−10−δˆwp0 = δwp−10−δwp0, δˆwp0−δˆwi0 =
δwp0 − δwi0. By substituting the solution of the previous equation to the next
equation in the above chain of equations, we have a unique solution of δˆ = δ.
We substitute the solution δˆ = δ into the original equation system Ax = b to
solve the remaining unknown variables eˆ. There are three cases for the equations
in Ax = b but not in Asδˆ = bs:
(1) For an actually faulty edge ni ↔ nj that is correctly assumed to be faulty,
the equation is δˆi0 − δˆj0 + eˆij = δi0 − δj0 + eij . By substituting δˆi0 = δi0
and δˆj0 = δj0 (which are from δˆ = δ) into the above equation, we have
eˆij = eij .
(2) For an actually non-faulty edge ni ↔ nj that is wrongly assumed to be
faulty, the equation is δˆi0 − δˆj0 + eˆij = δi0 − δj0. The solution is eˆij = 0.
(3) For an actually faulty edge ni ↔ nj that is wrongly assumed to be non-
faulty, the equation is δˆi0 − δˆj0 = δi0 − δj0 + eij . Since δˆi0 = δi0, δˆj0 = δj0,
and eij 6= 0 (which is the given condition), the above equation does not
hold.
The Ax = b that contains case (3) has no solution; the Ax = b that does
not contain case (3) has a unique solution that gives correct clock offset estimates.
Thus, Ax = b has at most one solution. 
Denote by A \B the relative complement of a set B with respect to a set A, i.e.,
the set of elements in A but not in B. We have the following lemma.
Lemma 2. For a complete NCS graph G = (V,E) and any edge subset M ⊆ E,
a sufficient condition for the subgraph G′ = (V,E \M) to be connected is |M | ≤
2 · (⌊N2 ⌋− 1), where N = |V |.
Proof. Let C1 denote the clause of |M | ≤ 2·
(⌊
N
2
⌋− 1); let C2 denote the clause ofG′
is connected. From logic, we have the following equivalence: (C1 ⇒ C2)⇔ (¬C1 ⇐
¬C2), where ¬ represents negation. The clause ¬C1 is |M | > 2 ·
(⌊
N
2
⌋− 1). As
|E| = N(N−1)2 , the clause ¬C1 is also equivalent to |E\M | ≤ N(N−1)2 −2·
(⌊
N
2
⌋− 1).
The clause ¬C2 is that G′ is disconnected. From the above reasoning, the sufficient
condition to be proved is equivalent to the following: a sufficient condition for
|E \M | ≤ N(N−1)2 − 2 ·
(⌊
N
2
⌋− 1) is that G′ is disconnected. In the following, we
prove this equivalent sufficient condition.
Since G′ is disconnected, we assume that it has a total of P partitions, where
P ≥ 2. Let Np ∈ Z>0 denote the number of vertices in the pth partition. Thus,∑P
p=1Np = N . Define Nr = N −N1 =
∑P
p=2Np. We have
Nr(Nr − 1)
2
=
(∑P
p=2Np
)(∑P
p=2Np − 1
)
2
=
P∑
p=2
Np (Np − 1)
2
+
∑
∀p,q∈[2,P ],p6=q
NpNq
≥
P∑
p=2
Np(Np − 1)
2
. (7)
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As the number of edges of the pth partition is no greater than
Np(Np−1)
2 , we have
|E \M | ≤ ∑Pp=1 Np(Np−1)2 = N1(N1−1)2 +∑Pp=2 Np(Np−1)2 ≤ N1(N1−1)2 + Nr(Nr−1)2 ,
where the last inequality follows from Eq. (7). By substituting Nr = N − N1
into the above inequality, we have |E \M | ≤ N(N−1)2 + N1(N1 − N). Note that
N1 ∈ [1, N − 1]. When N1 = 1 or N1 = N − 1, the quadratic N1(N1 − N)
achieves its maximum value of −(N − 1). Thus, |E \M | ≤ N(N−1)2 − (N − 1). As
−(N − 1) < −2 · (⌊N2 ⌋− 1), we have |E \M | ≤ N(N−1)2 − 2 · (⌊N2 ⌋− 1). 
5.3. Tight Bound of Maximum Resilience.
Theorem 1. The tight bound of maximum resilience of any N -node network with
a complete NCS graph G = (V,E) is ft(N) =
⌊
N
2
⌋− 1.
Proof. First, we prove that, if K ≤ ft(N), the network is K-resilient. Let k denote
the assumed number of faults in Algorithm 1, where k ≤ K. For any distribution of
the estimated faults, letM denote the set of edges excluded from E to generate the
fault-free NCS subgraph Gs. Thus, |M | ≤ k+K. Moreover, since k ≤ K ≤ ft(N),
we have |M | ≤ k+K ≤ 2 ·ft(N) = 2 ·
(⌊
N
2
⌋− 1). From Lemma 2, Gs is connected.
From Lemma 1, the NCS equation system Ax = b has at most one solution. Now,
we verify the K-resilience condition in Definition 2 as follows:
(1) When k < K: There must exist an actually faulty edge wrongly assumed
to be non-faulty, i.e., Case (3) in the proof of Lemma 1. Thus, the Ax = b
has no solution and Algorithm 1 will not return when k < K.
(2) When k = K: Only when the distribution of the estimated faults is correct,
the Ax = b does not encompass Case (3) in the proof of Lemma 1 and it
must yield a solution that gives correct clock offset estimates. Otherwise,
Ax = b must encompass Case (3) in the proof of Lemma 1 and it has no
solution.
Since the K-resilience condition holds, the network is K-resilient.
Second, we prove that, if K > ft(N), the network is not K-resilient. We prove
it using an example network that is not K-resilient. The example network has
the following two properties: (1) all actually faulty synchronization sessions and
all assumed faulty synchronization sessions involve a certain node ni; (2) each of
the edges involving ni is either actually faulty or assumed to be faulty, or both.
For this example network, k + K ≥ N − 1, where N − 1 is the total number of
edges involving ni. Moreover, as k ≤ K, we have 2K ≥ k + K ≥ N − 1 and
K ≥ N−12 >
⌊
N
2
⌋ − 1. Thus, the example network satisfies K > ft(N). We now
prove that this example network is notK-resilient. The fault-free NCS subgraph Gs
is disconnected and has two partitions. One of them involving all nodes except ni is
a complete NCS graph without any fault. Thus, a unique partial solution that give
correct clock offset estimate can be obtained for this partition. By substituting the
partial solution into the original equation system Ax = b, any remaining equation
that must involve ni will be in one of the following three forms: (1) δˆi0 = δi0 + eik,
(2) δˆi0 + eˆik = δi0 + eik, and (3) δˆi0 + eˆik = δi0. If all actual faults have identical
value, i.e., eik = e, the remaining equations will yield a solution that gives wrong
clock offset estimates, in which (1) δˆi0 = δi0 + e, (2) eˆik = 0, and (3) eˆik = −e that
respectively correspond to the three forms. Thus, the network is notK-resilient. 
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From Theorem 1, for networks with complete NCS graphs, the maximum number
of correctable faults increases with N in a nearly linear manner. However, the
number of edges increases with N quadratically. This suggests that, for networks
with complete NCS graphs, the fault correction capability decreases with N . Thus,
it is interesting to study whether we can remove edges from a complete NCS graph
while maintaining K-resilience. To answer this question, we analyze the resilience
bounds for NCS graphs that may be incomplete (Section 6) and then analyze the
minimum number of edges needed to ensure K-resilience (Section 8).
6. Algorithm to Compute Tight Bound of Maximum Resilience of any
Network
In this section, we study the tight bound for any NCS graphs that may be
incomplete. In Section 6.1, we interpret the K-resilience of any NCS graph from
the edge connectivity of the graph. The interpretation is mainly from the Menger’s
theorem [1]. Based on the edge-connectivity interpretation, in Section 6.2, we
present an algorithm to compute the tight bound of maximum resilience for any
given NCS graph. Note that, different from Section 5 that gives the closed-form
tight bound of maximum resilience of any complete NCS graph, the closed-form
tight bound may not exist for NCS graphs that may be incomplete, because the
K-resilience depends on the topology of the incomplete NCS graph.
6.1. Graph-Theoretic K-Resilience Condition. First, we define fault-free path
between any two nodes in a connected NCS graph. For any path between node ni
and nj , if every edge in the path is associated with neither estimated nor actual
synchronization fault, the path is called fault-free path. Note that for a certain
distribution of the estimated p2p synchronization faults among the sessions, any
path is either fault-free path or non-fault-free path.
Now, we introduce the concept of edge-connectivity [32] of any graph and mini-
mum edge cut of any pair of nodes to extend the fault-free NCS subgraph method.
In graph theory, a connected graph is L-edge-connected if it remains connected when
any no greater than L edges are removed from the graph. The edge-connectivity
of a graph is the largest L for which the graph is still L-edge-connected [32]. A
minimum edge cut of any pair of nodes is an edge cut of the pair such that there
is no other edge cut of the pair containing fewer edges. The Menger’s theorem [1]
stated below will be used to analyze the resilience of any NCS graph.
Theorem 2. Menger’s theorem [1]. In a graph G, the size of the minimum edge
cut of any pair of nodes is equal to the maximum number of disjoint paths that can
be found between the node pair. Extended to all node pairs, G is L-edge-connected
if and only if every node pair has L edge-disjoint paths connecting them.
Based on Menger’s theorem, we have the following theorem regarding the re-
silience of any NCS graph. In the proof, we use examples provided in italic text to
help understanding.
Theorem 3. An NCS graph G is K-resilient if and only if it is (2K + 1)-edge-
connected.
Proof. Let C1 denote the clause that an NCS graph G is K-resilient; let C2 denote
the clause that the NCS graph is (2K + 1)-edge-connected.
20 LINSHAN JIANG, RUI TAN, ARVIND EASWARAN
Proof of backward implication C2 ⇒ C1. Assuming that the NCS graph G
is (2K + 1)-edge-connected, from the Menger’s theorem, there exist 2K + 1 edge-
disjoint paths between any node nj and the reference node n0. In the case that
the network has K actual faults and k estimated faults where k ≤ K, the total
number of edges associated with the estimated or actual synchronization faults
is less than K + k. Note that K + k ≤ 2K. From the principle of drawers,
there exists at least one fault-free path among the 2K + 1 edge-disjoint paths
connecting nj and n0. We can formulate a system of equations along the above
fault-free path where each equation corresponds to an edge. We denote this fault-
free path as 〈n0, nw1 , nw2 , . . . , nwp , nj〉. The equation system on the path consists of
δˆw10 = δw10, δˆw10−δˆw20 = δw10−δw20, δˆw20−δˆw30 = δw20−δw30, . . ., δˆwp−10−δˆwp0 =
δwp−10 − δwp0, δˆwp0 − δˆwj0 = δwp0 − δwj0. Similar to the proof of Lemma 1, we can
substitute the solution of the previous equation to the next equation in the above
chain of equations to generate the solution of δˆj0 = δj0. By repeating the above
process for every non-reference node nj , we obtain a unique solution δˆ = δ. We
substitute the solution δˆ = δ into the original equation system Ax = b to solve the
remaining unknown variables eˆ. As shown in the proof of Lemma 1, when k = K
and the distribution of the estimated p2p synchronization faults is identical to the
distribution of the actual p2p synchronization faults, the NCS equation system
Ax = b has a unique solution that gives correct clock offset estimates. Otherwise,
it has no solution. Therefore, if an NCS graph G is (2K + 1)-edge-connected, it is
K-resilient, i.e., C2 ⇒ C1.
Proof of forward implication C1 ⇒ C2. We have the following equivalence:
(C1 ⇒ C2)⇔ (¬C1 ⇐ ¬C2). The ¬C2 means that the NCS graphG is not (2K+1)-
edge-connected; ¬C1 means that G is not K-resilient. In what follows, we prove
¬C1 ⇐ ¬C2. From the definition of K-resilience condition in Definition 2, G is not
K-resilient if we can find any of the following counterexamples: (1) Algorithm 1
returns a solution when the distribution of the estimated p2p synchronization faults
is different from the distribution of the actual faults or (2) Algorithm 1 returns
more than one solution when the distribution of the estimated p2p synchronization
faults is identical to the the distribution of the actual faults. In the following,
0
1 2
(a) N = 3, K = 1.
0
1
2
3
(b) N = 4, K = 2.
0
1
2 3
4
(c) N = 5, K = 2.
Figure 1. The counterexamples for the small-scale NCS graphs
with N = 3, 4, 5. Dotted edges denote the edges containing the
actual synchronization faults; dashed edges denote the edges con-
taining the estimated synchronization faults; the dashed-dotted
edges denote the edges containing both the estimated and actual
synchronization faults. The combination of all the above three
types of edges composes of the minimum cut C in a certain NCS
graph. The solid edges are fault-free edges.
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we find such counterexamples when G is not (2K + 1)-edge-connected. From the
Menger’s theorem, since G is not (2K + 1)-edge-connected, there is a minimum
edge cut C including at most 2K edges for a certain pair of nodes ni and nj.
The minimum edge cut C partitions G into two connected subgraphs Gi and Gj
that are disconnected from each other, where ni ∈ V(Gi), nj ∈ V(Gj), and V(G)
represents the set of G’s vertexes. Note that the reference node n0 is either in
the subgraph Gi or the subgraph Gj . Without loss of generality, we assume that
n0 ∈ V(Gi). Our counterexamples satisfy the following conditions: (1) there are
K actual faulty sessions and the number of estimated faults is equal to K, (2) all
the estimated faults and the actual faults are on the edge cut C and each edge of
the edge cut C is associated with an estimated fault, or an actual fault, or both of
them, (3) all the actual faults have an identical value e. For example, Fig. 1 shows
the counterexamples for the small-scale networks discussed in Section 4.2.
For the counterexamples described above, the following Eq. (8) is a solution of
Eq. (1):

δˆk0 = δk0, ∀nk ∈ V(Gi);
δˆk0 = δk0 − e, ∀nk ∈ V(Gj);
eˆij = 0, if there is an actual fault on ni ↔ nj ;
eˆij = −e, if there is no actual fault on ni ↔ nj .
(8)
For example, in Fig. 1(b), Eq. (8) is
δˆ10 = δ10;
δˆ20 = δ20;
δˆ30 = δ30 − e;
eˆ13 = 0;
eˆ23 = −e.
(9)
Now, we prove that Eq. (8) is a solution of Eq. (1) in the counterexamples. We
prove it by substituting Eq. (8) to Eq. (1). If there is no conflict on each equation of
the equation system in Eq. (1) (i.e., Eq. (1) still holds after incorporating Eq. (8)),
Eq. (8) is a solution of Eq. (1). Note that Eq. (1) can be separated into three
disjoint subequation systems corresponding to the subgraph Gi, Gj and the edge
cut C. Thus, if we substitute Eq. (1) to the three disjoint subequation systems
and there is no conflict on each equation, Eq. (8) is a solution of Eq. (1). Now,
we analyze each of the disjoint subequation systems incorporated with Eq. (1) as
follows.
(1) In the subequation system associated with Gi, since there are no edges
associated with the estimated or actual synchronization fault, the corre-
sponding equation in Eq. (1), denoted by E , has the form of δˆw0 − δˆv0 =
δ˜wv = δw0 − δv0, where nw ∈ V(Gi) and nv ∈ V(Gi). By substitut-
ing Eq. (8) to the left-hand side of E , we have δˆw0 − δˆv0 = δw0 − δv0,
which is equal to the right-hand side of E . Thus, there is no conflict
when substituting Eq. (8) to the subequation system associated with Gi.
For example, in Fig. 1(b), the subequation system associated with Gi is
{δˆ10 = δ10, δˆ20 = δ20, δˆ10 − δˆ20 = δ10 − δ20}. Substituting Eq. (9) into the
above subequation system does not result in any conflict.
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(2) In the subequation system associated with Gj , since there are no edges
associated with the estimated or actual synchronization fault, the corre-
sponding equation E in Eq. (1) has the form of δˆw0− δˆv0 = δ˜wv = δw0−δv0,
where nw ∈ V(Gj) and nv ∈ V(Gj). By substituting Eq. (8) to the left-
hand side of E , we have δˆw0 − δˆv0 = (δw0 − e) − (δv0 − e) = δw0 − δv0,
which is equal to the right-hand side of E . Thus, there is no conflict when
substituting Eq. (8) to the subequation system associated with Gj . For ex-
ample, in Fig. 1(b), the subequation system associated with Gj is an empty
set ∅, because there is only one node in the subgraph Gj. Thus, there is no
conflict between the empty set and the solution in Eq. (9).
(3) In the subequation system associated with C, since each edge is associated
with at least one fault between estimated and actual synchronization fault,
the corresponding equation E in Eq. (1) can be in any of the following three
forms:
(a) If the edge corresponding to E contains an estimated synchronization
fault but no actual synchronization fault, E has the form of δˆw0 −
δˆv0 + eˆwv = δ˜wv = δw0 − δv0, where nw ∈ V(Gi) and nv ∈ V(Gj). By
substituting Eq. (8) to the left-hand side of E , we have δˆw0−δˆv0+eˆwv =
δw0 − (δv0 − e) + (−e) = δw0 − δv0, which is equal to the right-hand
side of E . Thus, there is no conflict when substituting Eq. (8) to
the subequation system associated with C in this case. For example,
in Fig. 1(b), the subequation system associated with C in this case is
δˆ03 = δ03 + e, which is also in Eq. (9). Thus, there is no conflict.
(b) If the edge corresponding to E contains an actual synchronization fault
but no estimated synchronization fault, E has the form of δˆw0− δˆv0 =
δ˜wv = δw0 − δv0 + ewv, where nw ∈ V(Gi) and nv ∈ V(Gj). By
substituting Eq. (8) to the left-hand side of E , we have δˆw0 − δˆv0 =
δw0 − (δv0 − e) = δw0 − δv0 + e. Note that in our counterexamples,
all the actual faults have an identical value e, i.e., ewv = e. Thus,
δw0 − δv0 + e is equal to the left-hand side of E . There is no conflict
when substituting Eq. (8) to the subequation system associated with
C in this case. For example, in Fig. 1(b), the subequation system
associated with C in this case is δˆ20 − δˆ30 + eˆ23 = δ30 − δ20. Note that
in Eq. (9), eˆ23 = −e. Therefore, if we substitute Eq. (9) into the above
subequation system, there is no conflict.
(c) If the edge corresponding to E contains both an actual synchronization
fault and an estimated synchronization fault, E has the form of δˆw0 −
δˆv0+ eˆwv = δ˜wv = δw0− δv0+ewv, where nw ∈ V(Gi) and nv ∈ V(Gj).
Note that in this case eˆwv = 0 in Eq. (8). By substituting Eq. (8)
to the left-hand side of E , we have δˆw0 − δˆv0 + eˆwv = δw0 − (δv0 −
e) + 0 = δw0 − δv0 + e, which is equal to the right-hand side of E .
Thus, there is no conflict when substituting Eq. (8) to the subequation
system associated with C in this case. For example, in Fig. 1(b), the
subequation system associated with C in this case is δˆ10 − δˆ30 + eˆ13 =
δ10 − δ30 + e. Note that in Eq. (9), eˆ13 = 0. Therefore, substituting
Eq. (9) into the above subequation system results in no conflict.
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Algorithm 2 Compute the tight bound of maximum resilience
Given: NCS equation system Ax = b and the corresponding NCS graph G =
(V,E)
Output: Tight bound of maximum resilience of G
1: K ← 0
2: while K ≤ |E| do
3: for each combination of 2K edges selected from all the |E| edges in G do
4: remove the selected 2K edges to generate a subgraph G′
5: if G′ is not connected then
6: return K − 1
7: end if
8: end for
9: K ← K + 1
10: end while
Recall that in our counterexamples, each edge of the edge cut C is associated
with an estimated fault, or an actual fault, or both of them. Therefore,
there is no conflict when substituting Eq. (8) to the subequation system
associated with C.
In summary, we have substituted Eq. (8) to the three disjoint subequation sys-
tems and there is no conflict. Thus, Eq. (8) is a solution of Eq. (1). Now, we
prove that in this case, G is not K-resilient. If the distribution of the estimated
p2p faults is identical to the distribution of the actual faults, Eq. (1) has at least
two solutions including Eq. (8) and the solution {δˆ = δ, eˆ = e}, which violates
the condition (2)-(a) of the K-resilience condition defined in Definition 2. If the
two distributions are different, Eq. (1) has a solution of Eq. (8), which violates the
condition (2)-(b) of the K-resilience condition defined in Definition 2. Therefore,
for any NCS graph G that is not (2K + 1)-edge-connected, G is not K-resilient,
i.e., ¬C1 ⇐ ¬C2. Therefore, C1 ⇒ C2. 
6.2. Algorithm to Compute Tight Bound of Maximum Resilience. Based
on Theorem 3, Algorithm 2 computes the tight bound of the maximum resilience
for NCS graph G. Specifically, starting with K = 0, Algorithm 2 increases K by
one in each step of the outer loop to check whether the NCS graph is K-resilient
by checking the connectivity of the subgraphs after removing 2K edges from G.
If any subgraph is not connected, the sufficient and necessary condition given by
Theorem 3 is not satisfied for the current K value. Thus, the algorithm returns
K − 1 as the tight bound.
Now, we analyze the time complexity of Algorithm 2. For each K value, Al-
gorithm 2 needs to check the connectivity of totally
(
|E|
2K
)
subgraphs. Existing
graph-theoretic algorithms can be used to check the connectivity of a graph, such
as depth-first search (DFS) and breadth-first search (BFS) [3]. The DFS and BFS
algorithms have the same time complexity of O(|V |+ |E|). In particular, for com-
plete NCS graphs, the complexity of the two algorithms is O(|V |2). Thus, the
time complexity of the Kth step of Algorithm 2 is O
(
|V |2( |V ||V−1|2
2K
))
. Therefore,
determining the tight bound of maximum resilience for any graph incurs a high
computation overhead for large-scale NCS graphs. Nevertheless, Algorithm 2 is a
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Figure 2. The tight bounds of maximum resilience for several
incomplete NCS graphs with N = 5, 6, 7, 8.
method to exactly compute the tight bound of maximum resilience for incomplete
NCS graphs. Figure 2 shows several incomplete NCS graphs and their tight bounds
of maximum resilience computed by Algorithm 2.
7. Fast NCS Algorithm with Fault Correction
Algorithm 1 enumerates all possible distributions of the faults, leading to the
exponential time complexity in the worst case. From the proof of Theorem 3, if we
can find a fault-free path connecting ni and n0, we can obtain the correct estimate
of clock offset between ni and n0. This observation sheds light on a new NCS
algorithm that can correct the faults without enumerating all possible distributions
of the faults. In this section, we present such a new NCS algorithm. Then, we
show that the new NCS algorithm achieves the same fault correction capability as
Algorithm 1 and analyze the time complexity of the new NCS algorithm.
7.1. Fast NCS Algorithm. First, we prove that we can correctly estimate the
p2p clock synchronization offsets on the fault-free path. We have the following
lemma.
Lemma 3. Any fault-free path between the reference node n0 and node ni leads to
the correct estimate of ni’s clock offset, i.e., δˆi = δi.
Proof. Denote the path by 〈n0, nw1 , nw2 , . . . , nwp , ni〉. We can formulate a system
of equations along the path. Since all edges on the path are associated with neither
estimated nor actual synchronization fault, the equation system consists of a chain
δˆw10 = δw10, δˆw10−δˆw20 = δw10−δw20, δˆw20−δˆw30 = δw20−δw30, . . ., δˆwp−10−δˆwp0 =
δwp−10−δwp0, δˆwp0−δˆwi0 = δwp0−δwi0. By substituting the solution of the previous
equation to the next equation in the above chain of equations, we have a solution
that δˆi = δi. 
From Lemma 3, if for every node ni in G we can find at least one fault-free
path connecting ni and n0, we can obtain all the correct clock offset estimates,
i.e., δˆ = δ. Then, we can use the solution δˆ = δ to pinpoint the faulty p2p
synchronization sessions. Specifically, if δ˜ij 6= δˆi − δˆj, where δˆi and δˆj are from δˆ,
the p2p synchronization session between ni and nj is faulty. The fault is given by
eij = δ˜ij − (δˆi − δˆj).
Thus, the NCS problem becomes how to find a fault-free path between any
node ni and the reference node n0. This is challenging because the system has no
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Algorithm 3 Fast NCS algorithm with fault correction.
Given: {δ˜ij |∀ni ↔ nj ∈ E}
Output: {δˆj0|∀j ∈ [1, N − 1]} and {eˆij|∀ni ↔ nj ∈ E}
1: for each node ni in V where i 6= 0 do
2: compute the maximum number of pairwise edge-disjoint paths Zi and find a
corresponding set of such paths Si
3: for each path Pk ∈ Si do
4: compute the corresponding value of the estimated clock offset δˆki0
5: end for
6: δˆi0 ← the most frequent value in δˆki0, where k ∈ {1, 2, 3, ..., Zi}
7: end for
8: for each synchronization session ni ↔ nj do
9: if δ˜ij − (δˆi − δˆj) 6= 0 then
10: eˆij = δ˜ij − (δˆi − δˆj)
11: end if
12: end for
13: return {δˆj0|∀j ∈ [1, N − 1]} and {eˆij|∀ni ↔ nj ∈ E}
knowledge of the number of faults and their distribution among the |E| sessions.
We address this challenge using a voting scheme. The details are as follows. We
let Zi denote the maximum number of pairwise edge-disjoint paths connecting ni
and n0 and let Si denote a set of such paths. Existing algorithms can be used to
compute Zi and Si, such as those presented in [12], [31] and [24]. The worst-case
time complexity of these algorithms is O(|V |2). Assuming every path in Si is fault-
free, we apply the approach described in Lemma 3 to compute δˆi for every path
in Si. Note that there might be multiple different sets of pairwise edge-disjoint
paths with the identical set cardinality. The Si used in the following discussion
can be any one of them. If all the paths in the set Si are really fault-free, their
corresponding estimated clock offsets should be the same. Otherwise, they will be
different. We use the most frequent value among all the clock offset estimates as
the voting result, which is yielded as the final clock offset estimate δˆi. We repeat
the above process for every node ni to generate the voting result δˆi. After that,
we can correct the faults by following the procedure described in last paragraph.
Algorithm 3 shows the pseudocode of the new NCS algorithm. Algorithm 3 has the
same practicality as Algorithm 1 in that it requires neither the actual number nor
the actual distribution of the p2p synchronization faults.
7.2. Tight Bound of Maximum Resilience of Fast NCS with Fault Cor-
rection. In this section, we show that Algorithms 1 and 3 have the same fault
correction capability. Therefore, the networks with Algorithms 1 and 3 as the NCS
algorithm respectively have the same tight bound of maximum resilience.
Theorem 4. For any NCS graph G, Algorithms 1 and 3 achieve the same tight
bound of maximum resilience.
Proof. First, we prove that, if an NCS graph is K-resilient under Algorithm 1,
it is also K-resilient under Algorithm 3. From Theorem 3, the K-resilience of G
under Algorithm 1 is equivalent to that G is (2K + 1)-edge-connected. From the
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Menger’s theorem, the (2K+1)-edge-connectivity means that for any pair of nodes
ni and nj , there exist at least 2K + 1 edge-disjoint paths connecting them. Since
the number of actual faults is no greater than K, there are at least K +1 fault-free
paths between ni and n0. Thus, the majority voting in Algorithm 3 must give the
correct result and Algorithm 3 can correct the faults. Therefore, the NCS graph is
also K-resilient under Algorithm 3.
Then, we prove that, if an NCS graph G is not K ′-resilient under Algorithm 1,
it is also not K ′-resilient under Algorithm 3. We assume G with Algorithm 1 can
correct at most K faults, where K ′ ≥ K+1. From Theorem 3, G is (2K+1)-edge-
connected. Thus, there exists at least one node pair ni and nj that have 2K + 1
edge-disjoint paths and no more connecting them. Note that the system’s resilience
is independent from the choice of reference node, i.e., any node can be designated
as the reference node n0. Without loss of generality, we designate nj as n0. Now,
we consider the cases where there are K ′ faults, i.e., there are at least K +1 faults
since K ′ ≥ K + 1. For the case where all the K + 1 faults occur on the paths
among the 2K + 1 edge-disjoint paths, the remaining fault-free edge-disjoint paths
do not form the majority of Algorithm 3’s voting. As a result, Algorithm 3 cannot
correctly estimate the clock offset of ni and cannot correct the faults. Thus, the G
with Algorithm 3 is not K ′-resilient. 
Now, we analyze the time complexity of Algorithms 1 and 3. If the algorithm in
[24] is used to compute Zi and S1, Line 2 of Algorithm 3 has a time complexity of
O(|V |2). The loop from Line 3 to Line 5 has a time complexity of O(|V |), because
from Theorems 1 and 3, the maximum number of pairwise edge-disjoint paths is less
than
⌊
|V |
2
⌋
− 1. Line 6 has a time complexity of O(|V |) [23]. Thus, the loop from
Line 1 to Line 7 has a time complexity of O(|V |3). The loop from Line 8 to Line 12
has a time complexity O(|V |2). Therefore, the time complexity of Algorithm 3 is
O(|V |3 + |V |2) = O(|V |3).
In Section 3.1, we have shown that the time complexity upper bound of Algo-
rithm 1 is O(2|E|). Now, we derive the time complexity lower bound of Algorithm 1
for complete NCS graphs that are K-resilient. When there are K faults, the time
complexity of Algorithm 1 is O
(∑K
k=0
(
|E|
k
))
). From Theorem 1, Algorithm 1 can
correct at most K =
⌊
N
2
⌋− 1 faults. Thus, the time complexity of Algorithm 1 is
O
(∑⌊N2 ⌋−1
k=0
(N(N−1)
2
k
))
. When N > 4, we have the following inequality:
⌊N2 ⌋−1∑
k=0
(N(N−1)
2
k
)
>
N/2∑
k=0
(
N/2
k
)
=
√
2
N
. (10)
Thus, Algorithm 1 has an exponential complexity.
From the above analysis, Algorithm 3 achieves the same fault correction capabil-
ity as Algorithm 1 with a cubic time complexity. In practice, Algorithm 3 should be
used. Note that as Algorithm 1 is intuitive, the definition of fault resilience based
on Algorithm 1 is also intuitive. Differently, the development of Algorithm 3 is
based on our further analysis on the fault resilience. As a result, the fault resilience
notion behind Algorithm 3 is not direct. From this sense, Algorithm 1, though not
scalable to the network size, helps achieve a clear definition of fault resilience and
is still a basis of this paper.
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8. Minimum NCS Graph for K-Resilience
Section 5 and Section 6 analyzed the bounds of the number of faults that Al-
gorithm 1 and Algorithm 3 can correct. Differently, in this section, we aim at
minimizing the number of p2p synchronization sessions while maintaining the K-
resilience of a network under Algorithms 1 and 3. In other words, we aim at looking
for the minimum NCS graph for K-resilience, which is formally defined as follows.
Definition 6 (Minimum NCS graph for K-resilience). Denote by V a set of N
nodes. An NCS graph G = (V,E) is a minimum NCS graph for K-resilience if the
network with G is K-resilient and any network with the NCS graph G′ = (V,E′)
where |E′| < |E| is not K-resilient.
With minimum NCS graphs, we can minimize the communication cost of NCS
without compromising fault correction capability. In Section 8.1, we develop an
algorithm based on the K-resilience’s sufficient and necessary condition given by
Theorem 3 to compute the minimum NCS subgraphs and show several examples.
In Section 8.2, we derive the theoretic lower bound of the number of edges in the
NCS graph that provides K-resilience. The theoretic lower bound can be used to
understand the order of magnitude of the number of edges in a computed minimum
NCS graph. In particular, the number of edges of a computed minimum NCS graph
is identical to the theoretic lower bound in our computed examples. This implies
that the theoretic lower bound is tight.
8.1. The Algorithm to Compute Minimum NCS Graphs. Based on The-
orem 3, Algorithm 4 finds the minimum NCS graphs for any N -node network to
ensure K-resilience. Note that a network may have multiple different minimum
NCS graphs. Algorithm 4 returns a set of minimum NCS graphs that have the
same number of edges. We now explain Algorithm 4. The algorithm uses an N -
node complete NCS graph Gc = (V,Ec) as the basis to look for the minimum NCS
graphs. In each iteration of the while loop (from Line 3 to Line 25), the m is in-
creased by one from zero, where them represents the number of edges removed from
the Ec of Gc to generate a candidate minimum NCS graph G
′ (Line 6). For each
possible G′, the snippet from Line 7 to Line 14 uses Theorem 3 to check whether
G′ is K-resilient. If G′ is K-resilient, G′ is included into a set Gcurrent (Line 16)
that is reset to an empty set for the next m value (Line 4). If all possible G′ graphs
with the current m value cannot be confirmed K-resilient (i.e., Gcurrent = ∅), the
algorithm returns the non-empty Gcurrent in the previous iteration of the while loop.
This mechanism is implemented by Line 19 to Line 24. The algorithm gives the
minimum NCS graphs, because the snippet from Line 7 to Line 14 can confirm the
K-resilience of the candidate G′.
Fig. 3 shows several minimum NCS graphs computed by Algorithm 4 under
different settings of N and K. In Section 8.2, we will show that the number of
edges in all these graphs are equal to the theoretic lower bound.
8.2. Lower Bound of the Number of Edges for K-Resilience. In this section,
for any NCS graph G = (V,E) that provides K-resilience, we derive a lower bound
of |E|. We develop the following lemma that will be used to derive the bound.
Lemma 4. A necessary condition for an NCS graph G = (V,E) to give K-resilience
is mindeg(G) ≥ 2K+1 where mindeg(G) denotes the minimum degree of all vertexes
of G.
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Algorithm 4 Compute minimum NCS graphs for any N -node network with K-
resilience
Given: The number of nodes N , resilience value K
Output: A set of minimum NCS graphs G
1: m← 0, G ← ∅
2: construct the N -node complete NCS graph Gc = (V,Ec)
3: while m ≤ N(N−1)2 do
4: Gcurrent ← ∅
5: for each combination of m sessions among Ec do
6: remove the m sessions from Gc to generate an NCS subgraph G
′ = (V,E′)
7: resilient ← true
8: for each combination of 2K equations selected from all the |E′| sessions
do
9: remove the selected 2K edges to generate an NCS subgraph G′′
10: if G′′ is unconnected then
11: resilient ← false // G′ is not K-resilient
12: break
13: end if
14: end for
15: if resilient = true then
16: Gcurrent ← Gcurrent ∪ {G′}
17: end if
18: end for
19: if Gcurrent = ∅ then
20: return G // each G′ is not K-resilient for current m
21: else
22: G ← Gcurrent
23: end if
24: m← m+ 1
25: end while
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Figure 3. Minimum NCS graphs providing K-resilience com-
puted by Algorithm 4 under different K and N settings.
Proof. Theorem 3 shows that an NCS graph G is K-resilient if and only if it is
(2K + 1)-edge-connected. From Whitney’s theorem [33], the minimum number of
edges whose deletion results in disconnectivity of G is no greater than the minimum
RESILIENCE BOUNDS OF NETWORK CLOCK SYNCHRONIZATION 29
degree mindeg(G). Thus, a necessary condition for an NCS graph G = (V,E) to
give K-resilience is mindeg(G) ≥ 2K + 1. 
Theorem 5. For an NCS graph G = (V,E) providing K-resilience, |E| ≥
⌈
N(2K+1)
2
⌉
,
where N = |V |. In other words, a necessary condition for G to be K-resilient is
|E| ≥
⌈
N(2K+1)
2
⌉
.
Proof. Let C1 denote the clause that G is K-resilient; let C2 denote the clause that
mindeg(G) ≥ 2K + 1. Lemma 4 can be represented in logic as: C1 ⇒ C2.
From Lemma 4, to realize K-resilience, each node in G should have a degree of
at least 2K + 1. We adopt a greedy algorithm to construct the graph G∗ with the
minimum number of edges subject to the condition of mindeg(G∗) ≥ 2K + 1. The
algorithm is as follows. Starting from no edges, each step of the algorithm adds
an edge to connect two nodes that do not have an edge and the degree of each
of them is no greater than any other nodes. The algorithm terminates once the
condition mindeg(G∗) ≥ 2K + 1 is satisfied. The resulting graph of this algorithm
is as follows. First, when N is an even number, the degree of every node is 2K+1.
The total number of edges is N2 ·(2K+1). Second, when N is an odd number, there
are a total of (N − 1) nodes each having a degree of (2K + 1) and the remaining
one node having a degree of (2K + 2). The total number of edges is
⌈
N(2K+1)
2
⌉
.
In summary, the minimum number of edges to meet mindeg(G∗) ≥ 2K + 1 is⌈
N(2K+1)
2
⌉
. Denoting by C3 the clause of |E| ≥
⌈
N(2K+1)
2
⌉
, the above result can
be represented in logic as C2 ⇒ C3.
Since C1 ⇒ C2 and C2 ⇒ C3, we have C1 ⇒ C3, i.e., C3 is a necessary condition
for C1. 
The lower bound given by Theorem 5 can be used to understand the order of
magnitude of the number of edges in a computed minimum NCS graph. Table 4
shows the lower bound values under several settings of N and K as well as the num-
bers of the edges of the corresponding minimum NCS graphs shown in Fig. 3. We
can see that the minimums are identical to the lower bound values, which implies
that the theoretic lower bound is tight. Thus, we can see that the relationship be-
tween the communication overhead (which is characterized by the number of edges)
and the network size N is roughly linear. Therefore, order-wise, the communication
overhead for achieving K-resilience is acceptable.
In the traditional synchronization methods that do not provide any fault correc-
tion capbility, one slave node synchronizes with only one master node. Thus, the
number of edges in the NCS graph of the traditional synchronization methods is
N−1. From the result given by Theorem 5, the additional communication overhead
for K-resilience is at least
⌈
N(2K+1)
2
⌉
− (N − 1) =
⌈
N(2K−1)
2
⌉
+ 1. For instance,
when K = 1 and N = 8, the additional communication overhead is at least five
p2p synchronization sessions.
9. Implication of Results
This section discusses several important implications of the analytic results ob-
tained in the previous sections.
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Table 4. The lower bound of the number of edges in NCS graph
providing K-resilience and the number of edges in the computed
minimum NCS graphs shown in Fig. 3, as well as the upper bound
of degree of resilience (DoR) that is defined in Section 9.1.
N K Lower bound Number of edges Upper bound
from Theorem 5 in Fig. 3 of DoR
5 1 8 8 1/8
6 1 9 9 1/9
6 2 15 15 1/7.5
7 1 11 11 1/11
7 2 18 18 1/9
8 3 28 28 1/9.3˙
9.1. The Most Fault-Resilient Network. If every p2p synchronization session
has the same fault rate, the degree of resilience (DoR) defined as the ratio of the
maximum number of correctable faults (i.e., K) and the number edges in an NCS
graph (i.e., |E|) becomes a meaningful metric that characterizes the allowable per-
centage of faulty p2p synchronization sessions. We have the following corollary.
Corollary 1. The 4-node network with complete NCS graph achieves the highest
DoR.
Proof. We use the lower bound given by Theorem 5 to derive an upper bound of
DoR when N ≥ 4:
DoR ≤ K⌊
N(2K+1)
2
⌋
− 1
≤ K
N(2K+1)
2 − 2
=
2K
N(2K + 1)− 4
≤ 2K + 1
N(2K + 1)− 4 =
1
N − 42K+1
≤ 1
N − 43
, (11)
where the last inequality follows from K ≥ 1. Therefore, DoR = O ( 1N ), suggesting
that larger networks will have lower degree of resilience when N is large enough.
From Theorem 1, the DoR of the 4-node network is 1/6. To ensure that the
DoR upper bound given in Eq. (11) is smaller than 1/6 (i.e., 1N−4/3 < 1/6), we
have N ≥ 8. In other words, when N ≥ 8, the network’s DoR must be smaller than
1/6. Now, we check the DoRs of the networks when N ∈ [5, 7]. The last column of
Table 4 gives the upper bound of DoR that is the ratio of K and the third column
(i.e., the lower bound of the number of edges from Theorem 5). From the results,
we can see that when N ∈ [5, 7], the upper bound of DoR is smaller than 1/6.
Therefore, the 4-node network achieves the highest DoR of 1/6. 
9.2. Tiered Clock Synchronization for Fault Resilience. The result in Sec-
tion 9.1 suggests that, for a large-scale network, we can group the nodes into 4-node
synchronization groups, forming the first tier of the clock synchronization. Each
synchronization group with a complete NCS graph will use Algorithm 3 to correct
at most one fault. Every four central nodes from four tier-1 synchronization groups
form a synchronization group in the second tier of the clock synchronization. Simi-
larly, each tier-2 synchronization group will use Algorithm 3 to correct at most one
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Figure 4. A two-tier 16-node clock synchronization architecture
consisting of four 4-node tier-1 synchronization groups (solid lines)
and one 4-node tier-2 synchronization groups (dashed lines).
fault. More tiers are formed until all nodes in the network are connected. The NCS
is executed from top to down in the tiered architecture.
We now use an example to illustrate. Suppose a network has 16 nodes. A two-
tier clock synchronization with four 4-node tier-1 synchronization groups and one 4-
node tier-2 synchronization group can be formed, as illustrated in Fig. 4. The tier-2
synchronization group executes NCS first. Then, each of the tier-1 synchronization
group executes its own NCS. As such, all 16 nodes can be synchronized even if each
synchronization group has a p2p synchronization faults (i.e., totally five faults).
Note that the total number of edges in this two-tier network is 30. Alternatively,
we can also use Algorithm 4 to construct the minimum NCS graph for the 16-
node network without the tiered architecture. From Theorem 5, the minimum
NCS graph that provides 5-resilience will have at least
⌈
16×(2×5+1)
2
⌉
= 88 edges.
Therefore, there is a trade-off between the above two solutions. In the minimum
NCS graph without the tiered architecture, the five faults can occur on any five
edges. However, the number of edges of the minimum NCS graph will be about
three times of the tiered architecture shown in Fig. 4. On the other hand, while
the tiered architecture uses less edges and thus incurs less communication cost,
the five faults that the network can correct need to be distributed among the five
synchronization groups.
10. Conclusion
This paper studied the resilience of network clock synchronization based on prac-
tical p2p synchronization fault correction algorithms. Our analysis gave the follow-
ing results:
(1) A closed-form tight bound of the maximum number of faults that can be
corrected when every node pair in the network performs p2p synchroniza-
tion, with respect to the number of nodes N . The tight bound is
⌊
N
2
⌋− 1.
(2) An algorithm to compute the tight bound of the maximum number of faults
that can be corrected when not every node pair performs p2p synchroniza-
tion.
(3) A fast NCS algorithm with a time complexity of O(N3) that achieves the
same fault correction capability as the original NCS algorithm that has an
exponential time complexity.
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(4) An algorithm that minimizes the number of p2p synchronization sessions
while ensuring that a specified number of faults can be corrected.
(5) A theoretic lower bound of the number of p2p synchronization sessions
needed to correct K faults. The lower bound is
⌈
N(2K+1)
2
⌉
.
Lastly, we showed that the 4-node network achieves the highest degree of resilience.
Based on this, we discussed a tiered clock synchronization architecture that pro-
vides understood resilience and requires reduced p2p synchronization sessions. The
results in this paper provide important understanding on the resilience of network
clock synchronization against p2p synchronization faults and useful guidelines for
the design of resilient clock synchronization systems.
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